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ABSTRACT 
 
We find a robust relationship between motor vehicle ownership, its interaction with legal heritage 
and obesity in OECD countries.  Our estimates indicate that an increase of 100 motor vehicles per 
thousand residents is associated with about a six percentage point increase in obesity in common law 
countries, whereas it has a much smaller or insignificant impact in civil law countries. These 
relations hold whether we examine trend data and simple correlations, or conduct cross-section or 
panel data regression analysis. Our results suggest that obesity rises with motor vehicle ownership in 
countries following a common law tradition where individual liberty is encouraged, whereas the link 
is small or statistically non-existent in countries with a civil law background where the rights of the 
individual tend to be circumscribed by the power of the state.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We contribute to the literature on the impact of governmental behavior on human welfare by 
establishing a surprising link between legal heritage and rising obesity in the developed world. 
Obesity represents an international epidemic affecting millions around the globe, with a myriad of 
government interventions consuming significant state and national budgets. Given current growth 
rates, obesity is projected to afflict 103 million Americans prior to the end of the decade. The US is 
projected to spend $344 billion on obesity related health care problems corresponding to 21 percent 
of healthcare spending, with a per-capita expense of $1425 (Thorpe 2009). Obesity is often quoted as 
the fastest growing public concern in many countries, leading to thousands of deaths annually and 
closely linked to many adverse medical conditions.  
We examine OECD data on per capita motor vehicle ownership and obesity in the context of 
legal heritage. Utilizing a range of empirical techniques including the analysis of trend data, simple 
correlations, cross-sectional and panel data, we find significant evidence of a direct relationship 
between motor vehicle ownership and obesity.1 Interestingly, the link is very strong in countries with 
a common law heritage and either non-existent or very much weaker in countries with a civil law 
heritage. The finding is not entirely unexpected as common law tends to restrict while civil law 
extends the power of the state, affecting in turn choices regarding motor vehicle ownership. Our 
results suggest that countries with a common law heritage may be at a disadvantage in combating the 
obesity promoting effects of motor vehicle ownership. This indicates how a constitutional 
arrangement such as a legal system may interact with daily choices of individuals to produce severe 
public health problems with social and economic consequences. Our results contrast with the 
burgeoning literature echoing Hayek (1973) which points to the superiority of common law for 
                                                 
1 We use the standard definition of obesity. Given weight in kilograms (kg) and height in meters (m), an individual is 
considered obese if their body mass index (=kg/m2) exceeds 30. 
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economic welfare, see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005). 
Two core competing explanations for the rising tide of obesity both in the US and elsewhere2 
are (i) the role of reduced exercise, especially on the job, see Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002), 
Philipson (2001) and Philipson and Posner (1999) and (ii) increased calorie intake, see Cutler, 
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003). Thus ceteris paribus increases in calorie intake or reductions in physical 
activity lead to an increase in weight. 
Philipson emphasizes the role of technological change in reducing the physical expenditure of 
calories per hour worked in the market and at home. This raises the cost of expending calories as 
time is diverted from passive to active leisure activities rather than exercise being a by-product of 
work hours. Following the lead of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999), Cutler et 
al stress the role of legal heritage and regulatory authority on access to food preparation technology. 
Restricted access to such technology raises the price of fast, calorie-heavy meals, thus limiting the 
caloric intake and hence the development of obesity.3  
La Porta et al (1999) argue that common law tradition (as in England) is a proxy for intent to 
limit the state while civil law tradition as in France, Germany and other European countries is a 
proxy for intent to extend the power of the state. Common law countries tend to emphasize the 
private rights of individuals in any regulation; civil law countries focus regulation on obtaining an 
appropriate resolution from the state’s viewpoint. Quoting Damaska (1986), La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2008) express the difference as: while common law is “dispute resolving”, civil 
                                                 
2 See OECD Health Division data at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/51/37622205.xls for data showing rising obesity rates in 
all OECD countries, albeit from very different levels. The U.S. doubled its rate from around 15 percent in 1978 to over 
30 by 2000; in the UK the rate tripled from around 7 in 1980 to 21 percent by 2000; most countries on the continent of 
Europe rose from 5 to 7 percent in the 1970s and 1980s to the 9 to 13 percent range by the early 2000’s. The contrast in 
levels may not be quite as stark because the European levels are based on self-reports while those for the USA and the 
UK are based on actual measurements taken. Nevertheless substantial differences in levels would likely remain were the 
Europeans to use the same measurement techniques. 
3 Of course, technological improvements have also contributed to many scientific advances, especially in common law 
countries, so these restrictions may have unintended side effects. Furthermore, civil law governments may not always 
implement what is best for social welfare. 
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law is “policy implementing”. Further, alluding to Pistor (2006), they argue that common law 
supports “unconditioned private contracting” in contrast to French Civil Law, which embraces 
“socially conditioned private contracting”. Given that legal system refers to over-arching ideas, rules 
and regulations in a country, La Porta et al (2008) “adopt a broad conception of legal origin as a style 
of social control of economic life (and maybe of other aspects of life as well)” (p. 3). Strong support 
is provided by diverse literatures demonstrating the impact of legal origin on several spheres of 
economic life, including financial development, unemployment, investment and business formation, 
the size of the unofficial economy, and international trade together with economic growth (e.g., La 
Porta/ Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 2002, Djankov et al 2002, Botero et al 2004, and 
Mulligan and Shleifer 2005. See La Porta et al 2008 and the references therein).  
There are at least two channels for legal systems to affect obesity through motor vehicle 
ownership. The first channel is direct motor vehicle regulation and the second is indirect via 
restrictions on urban sprawl. Following La Porta et al’s (2008) notion that the influence of legal 
origin extends to social control of life, one may argue that, in civil law countries, the state tends to 
place greater restraint on the private use of motor vehicles, particularly in regard to commuting. 
These restraints often take the form of high taxes, parking fees and restrictions, limited spaces, or 
outright bans on motor vehicle usage. The Transportation Research Board (2001) notes that, 
“Gasoline prices are indeed much higher in Western Europe than in the United States, mainly 
because of higher taxes. Moreover, motor vehicle sales and excise taxes, registration charges, license 
fees, and other government levies are higher.” On parking, the Transportation Research Board 
reports that fewer than ten percent of American commuters pay any parking fee. In contrast, 
“Although many Western European businesses also provide free parking for their customers and 
employees, a higher proportion of businesses are located in commercial districts where parking is 
limited by available space and government regulations.” This latter quote makes it clear that 
governments in Western Europe (with predominantly civil law heritage) tend to restrict parking. This 
 5 
suggests that increased motor vehicle ownership in common law countries will have fewer restraints 
placed on individual discretion; in civil law countries, regulation will channel the reliance of motor 
vehicles in ways the state perceives appropriate. Under civil law mass transit alternatives benefit 
from these restrictions leading to an associated societal increase in physical activity. 
In terms of urban sprawl, the positive relationship between spatial development of cities and 
physical inactivity, obesity and other health problems is widely documented (e.g., Ewing et al. 2003, 
Zhao and Kaestner 2010). On the other hand, common (civil) law countries are likely to be 
associated with lower (greater) regulatory barriers to the spread of home ownership to the far 
suburbs, with a concomitant decrease (increase) in population density and increased (decreased) 
reliance on motor vehicles.4 Automobile dependence in common law countries is evident from 
Houghton’s (2003) estimates of per capita greenhouse gas emissions: of the top twenty countries 
ranked by per capita gas emissions in 2000, sixteen were common law countries. Furthermore, the 
International Association of Public Transport (2005) points to the difference between civil and 
common law countries as follows: “the gaps separating ‘energy efficient’ towns from ‘high energy 
consumption’ towns are considerable: from 12,000 to 16,000 mega joules per year per inhabitant in 
the majority of European towns to over 30,000 in North American and Australian towns. In concrete 
terms, this gap represents 400 to 500 kg of crude oil per inhabitant per year.”5 Hence the cross-
country impact of increased motor vehicle usage on the level of obesity may differ by legal heritage. 
We present evidence in section 5 below that neither region per se nor population density drives our 
main results. 
                                                 
4 Consider OECD cities of 1.5 million population or larger; 27 rank in the top 100 cities ranked by population density 
with twenty-two civil law countries and five common law countries. In the next 100 densest cities, the situation is 
reversed; thirty represent common law countries and five civil law countries. Large cities in common law countries tend 
to have lower density, consistent with the notion that these countries have fewer restrictions on urban sprawl. (City 
Mayors [2011])  
5 Further to the point, Catford (2003) reports that transport is the second highest household expenditure item in Australia 
(15.5%), with 93.6% of this being for private motoring and 6.4% of  it being for public transport. 
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In our work we focus on OECD countries; the main advantage is that all member countries 
are relatively advanced in their economic development, have relatively comparable data, yet vary in 
their cultural and legal heritage. Following La Porta et al (1999), we distinguish between civil and 
common law countries, and also briefly consider the sub-categories of civil law, i.e. French, German, 
Scandinavian and Old Socialist legal systems. The central goal is to investigate the relationship 
between obesity and the interaction between motor vehicle ownership and legal heritage. 
Results across panel and instrumental variable approaches with fixed and random effects are robust. 
Overall, having 100 extra motor vehicles per 1000 residents raises obesity rates by between 4 and 5 
percentage points in common law countries.  However, this effect is significantly reduced in civil 
law countries and, in fact, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero impact. Reductions in motor 
vehicle ownership in common law countries would have a substantial impact on obesity rates but the 
same reductions in civil law countries would essentially have no effect. This reinforces the view that 
it is not ownership of motor vehicles per se, but the interaction with access and regulation that affects 
the degree of obesity. This result is in stark contrast to the recent literature pointing to the superior 
performance of common law vis-à-vis civil law heritage with respect to economic welfare [La Porta 
et al (1999) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) for example].  
 
2. DATA 
Our data come primarily from the OECD National Accounts Statistics. The available 
information allows us to form an unbalanced panel, which includes 147 observations spanning 29 
countries between 1990 and 2005.6 The dependent variable in our analysis is Obesity, the percentage 
of residents who are obese. Key explanatory variables include: Motor Vehicles (number of motor 
vehicles per 1000 residents); Civil (1 if the country has a civil law tradition, 0 if the legal system type 
                                                 
6 The OECD data listed no motor vehicle ownership data for Mexico. Furthermore, Mexico had only one observation 
available for obesity, pertaining to the year 2000. So Mexico was not included in our sample. 
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is common law); and the interaction between Motor Vehicles and Civil.  We use the La Porta et al 
(1999) assignment of legal heritage. Specifically, the common law countries in our sample consist of 
Great Britain, Ireland, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US. All other countries in our data 
set belong to the civil law tradition. La Porta (1999) utilizes the disaggregation7 of civil law countries 
in an analysis of the impact of legal heritage on such diverse topics as political freedom, government 
intervention and public sector size and provision. We explore an equivalent disaggregated 
classification in the context of obesity. 8, 9  
In the empirical analysis, we control for PPP-adjusted Gross Domestic Product per capita (in 
US dollars), available from the OECD National Accounts Statistics. This avoids confounding motor 
vehicle effects with overall development effects on obesity. Cutler et al (2003) argue that this 
variable proxies mass food preparation technology that facilitates the consumption of foods with 
high calorie content, and thus greater obesity.10 In line with economic reasoning, we also consider 
lagged health expenditures, food prices, and log population density as potential regressors in the 
obesity specification.11 
 
Trends and Relations 
                                                 
7 The sub-division revolves around cross-county differences in corporation law. 
8 OECD countries are fairly equally distributed across more disaggregated civil law categories. The French law countries 
include Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. The German law 
countries are Austria, Germany, Japan, South Korea and Switzerland. The countries having a Scandinavian legal system 
are Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and the old socialist countries are Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak 
Republic, and Poland.  
9 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) update this classification, mainly re-assigning former communist bloc 
countries to their pre-communism legal systems. Because our focus is on motor vehicle dependence and the related habits 
which would be relevant in the long term, we stick to the old socialist classification for such countries. 
10 Cutler et al also use female participation in the labor force as a control but we do not elect to use it due to its high 
correlation with GDP per capita (the correlation coefficient is 0.52 in our sample). 
11 The food price index is obtained from International Labour Organization consumer prices (food indices) data; public 
expenditure on health as percentage of total health expenditure is from OECD Health Statistics, and population density 
from the World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 1 shows a scatter diagram for 29 OECD countries with motor vehicles per 1,000 
residents and obesity in a cross-sectional context.12 It is evident that the unconditional relationship is 
positive. A panel data set enables us to look at a broader set of observations from 1990 to 2005. 
There are 30 observations for the six common law countries and 117 for the 23 civil law countries. 
[Please insert Figure 1 about here.] 
As seen through Figures 2 and 3, there appears to be a strong, positive association for the common 
law countries, although the impression is undoubtedly accentuated by the three U.S. data points in 
the far northeast corner of the scatter diagram.13 The relationship for the civil law countries also 
appears positive but is difficult to discern due to the scattering of observations in the northwest 
[Please insert Figures 2 and 3 about here.] 
quadrant with fairly high obesity levels and low motor vehicles per capita. These data points are 
associated with the former Soviet bloc countries of Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. 
Nevertheless, the slope of the fitted regression line is noticeably flatter than in the common law case. 
The correlation coefficient for Motor Vehicles and obesity is only +0.06 in civil law countries 
compared to +0.70 for the common law countries, with the former being insignificant and the latter 
highly significant. Although both correlations are positive, the coefficient for the common law 
countries is noticeably higher.  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for all variables employed in the empirical analysis. 
[Please insert Table 1 about here.] 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 We form a cross-country data set from the panel data set by averaging the observations belonging to the 1998-2003 
period. This period maximizes the number of countries that can be included in the analysis. Two exceptions are Australia, 
which provides data from 1995, and Poland, whose 1996 and 2004 observations are averaged.  
13 Median motor vehicle ownership in common law countries is 538 per 1000 residents while it is 500 in civil law 
countries. We fail to reject the equality of medians at the 5% level.  
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3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
Our approach is to estimate the following reduced form regression: 
 
(1)       ε+Γ+Β= VXY , 
 
where, for the 29 OECD countries, Y is the percentage of residents who are obese, X is a vector of 
variables including legal heritage, PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (in natural logarithms) and its 
square, time dummies and other controls.  Besides capturing non-model variation in obesity over 
time, time dummies also help eliminate the disadvantage related to drawing observations from an 
unbalanced data set. V is a vector including Motor Vehicles and an interaction term between Motor 
Vehicles and legal heritage. A priori we expect Motor Vehicles to be positively related to obesity, 
with this effect weaker in countries with civil law origins where the use of motor vehicles is more 
highly regulated. We estimate several variants of this model to check the sensitivity of our results; 
robustness is discussed further in section 5. 
We include additional control variables in our benchmark specification capturing other 
possible determinants of obesity outside the specified channels. While a full-blown economic model 
of obesity is beyond the scope of this paper, economic reasoning suggests that food prices, log 
population density, and public health expenditure on obesity may be relevant regressors.14 Of these, 
log population density controls for space differences between common law countries such as the US, 
Australia and New Zealand, which are large in space relative to population, and European countries 
which are generally tight in space and follow civil law. Also, given increased government funding of 
                                                 
14 Car prices may also be relevant in a reduced form. Comparable car price data  for recent times are available only for 
the EU countries (see Degryse and Verboven 2000). Thus, it is difficult to capture most of the common law countries. 
Nevertheless, inability to control for car prices in the regression should not affect our results. Degryse and Verboven 
argue that car price differentials across countries can be explained by exchange rate fluctiations in the short-term and 
taxes in the long-term.  One can add transportation costs to this list, considering the non-EU countries in our sample. But 
note that transportation costs would be captured by country-fixed effects in our models, and tax regimes can reasonably 
be explained by legal systems. Exchange rate fluctuations are unlikely to affect obesity in the short-term. 
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obesity prevention initiatives we proxy obesity-related expenditure via public health expenditure as a 
share of total health expenditure .15, 16  We use lagged values of the public health expenditure share.17 
 We start with cross-section ordinary least squares (OLS) to establish a benchmark. We then 
turn to fixed and random effects panel OLS estimation on our unbalanced panel. To address potential 
endogeneity concerns we identify potential instruments for a two-stage least squares estimation and, 
in our preferred specification, utilize fixed effects limited information maximum likelihood 
estimation. Finally we explore the robustness of our results to a variety of specifications. The 
extensive sensitivity and robustness checks confirm our main results are robust across both 
estimation method and specification. 
  
4. RESULTS 
4.1. OLS Results: Cross-Sectional Data  
Despite a modest sample size, the cross-sectional dataset is useful to get a feel for the basic 
relationships. Model 1 of Table 2 shows that the unconditional relationship between Motor Vehicles 
and obesity is positive, but significant at only the 17% level. Model 2 presents the unconditional 
[Please insert Table 2 about here.] 
association between Civil and obesity. The results suggest that the level of obesity is on average 
8.7% higher in countries with common law heritage relative to civil law countries. The distinction is 
highly significant. Model 3 reports the conditional associations involving Motor Vehicles, Civil and 
their interaction. Motor Vehicles is a positive and statistically significant determinant of obesity. The 
                                                 
15 Even these data are not comprehensively available for an analysis that is consistent with our investigation (available 
only for less than half of the dataset). Hence we extrapolate these data to obtain a comparable sample. The means and the 
standard deviations of original and extrapolated data are highly similar. As an additional robustness check we also used 
public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP instead of health data. Results were similar.  
16 Obesity-related expenditures are only a part of the total health expenditures (note that the share projected for the US for 
2018 is 21%). 
17 While one may argue for reverse causation from the level of obesity to the amount of money allocated from the budget 
to alleviate the epidemic,there is no indication that funds spent have worked to cure or alleviate the obesity problem so 
far. Rather, governments still seem to be reactive. On the other hand, funds spent are unlikely to affect the BMIs in the 
same year, so the use of lagged health expenditures is again appropriate in that respect. 
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intercept Civil is also positive and significant at 10%. Moreover, the sign and magnitude of the 
interaction term implies that the slope effect is substantively and significantly different depending on 
whether the country in question has a civil or a common law tradition. Specifically, it suggests that 
motor vehicle ownership is positively related to obesity in common law countries, while the effect is 
almost zero in the civil law countries. Adding a quadratic in log GDP per capita to the regression in 
Model 4 makes little difference to the above results, except the intercept Civil becomes insignificant. 
Moreover, as in Cutler et al (2003), we find log GDP per capita (and its square) to be insignificant in 
the cross-sectional context. 
The limited degrees of freedom available with the cross-sectional data do not allow us to 
explore additional factors. We would like to stress that, in this cross-sectional analysis, motor vehicle 
ownership may be viewed as a proxy for physical activity/exercise, and that it may be strongly 
correlated with other country level variables that are not captured in the equation, such as type of 
food, crime and police protection, parking availability, and so on. Nevertheless, this finding offers 
significant preliminary support for our suggested relationships between legal system, motor vehicle 
ownership and obesity.  
 
4.2. OLS Results: Panel Data 
 We explore the panel dimension extensively using OLS first but later consider 2SLS and 
LIML. For each estimator except LIML, we adopt both Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) 
treatments to address the country-specific effects in the data; RE is not applicable to LIML. The RE 
model has the advantage of keeping time-invariant legal system variables in the regression while 
addressing the panel effects.18 But RE also requires that country-effects be uncorrelated with the 
independent variables. 
                                                 
18Our main results are robust to the choice of FE vs. RE. 
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 Table 2 also presents the OLS panel data results. Only fixed effects [FE] results are presented 
because the Hausman tests do not support the RE treatment for panel effects within the context of 
OLS. Nevertheless, the FE results strongly reaffirm the cross-section results in terms of the 
suggested relationships, providing several important implications.19 Model 5 reports the insignificant 
unconditional relationship between Motor Vehicles and Obesity. Model 6 introduces legal heritage 
and its interaction with Motor Vehicles. The results suggest that Motor Vehicles is positively and 
significantly related to Obesity in common law countries, with a marginal effect of 4.4% while this 
effect is almost zero in civil law countries, given the magnitude of the interaction term. Adding a 
quadratic in log GDP per capita to the specification in Model 7 has little impact on the results. 
However, contrary to the Cutler et al finding, a significant curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship is 
suggested between GDP per capita and obesity with our panel data.  At this stage of our analysis, 
Model 7 is the preferred specification, with motor vehicles per capita increasing obesity by 3.8 
percentage points in common law countries with little effect in civil law countries. 
 
4.3. 2SLS and LIML Results: Panel Data 
Endogeneity of Motor Vehicles 
It may be argued that higher levels of obesity are associated with greater reliance on motor 
vehicles for transportation as captured by motor vehicles per capita. This suggests a possible reverse 
causation between the dependent variable and Motor Vehicles and its interactions in Equation (1).20 
Thus, we adopt an instrumentation strategy whereby M2/GDP and petrol purchasing power (Petrol) 
are employed as instruments for Motor Vehicles. M2/GDP is widely utilized in the literature as a 
variable proxying the level of financial depth in a country. Higher levels of M2/GDP point to a 
                                                 
19 The Fixed Effects treatment removes the cross-country variation in the data and the remaining variation in the data is 
only due to within-country variation over time.  
20 One may also argue that legal heritage is not completely exogenous in that it may be shaped by people’s unobserved 
tastes and preferences, and is largely cultural. We follow the La Porta et al. (2008) argument that these rules are norms 
which are largely exogenous to a country, at least in an obesity regression. Further, the arguments against the exogeneity 
of legal heritage seem to rest on country-level time-invariant factors, which are addressed through our panel treatment. 
 13 
broader based financial system where citizens have easier access to funds for borrowing. Thus, ease 
of borrowing, leasing, and other financial arrangements is expected to be associated with more motor 
vehicles in a country. The other instrument, Petrol, is PPP-adjusted GDP per capita divided by the 
price of one liter of petrol as charged in petrol stations.21 The ability to purchase greater amounts of 
petrol for a typical level of income provides a stronger incentive to own a car.22 Together these 
represent two key elements in the budgeting process, i.e. access to the necessary funds for financing 
a car, and if financed, ability to run the car, given petrol costs.  Hence a set of three instruments, 
M2/GDP, Petrol, and their interaction, is employed in our two stage least squares estimation.  
Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix display strong initial support for our choice of instrumental 
variables to tackle the endogeneity problem. Motor vehicle ownership is positively associated with 
both M2/GDP and petrol purchasing power. In addition to the levels of M2/GDP and Petrol, we also 
consider their product given that these two key elements may interact in the motor vehicle purchase 
decision. For instance, higher petrol expenses imply lower ability to make repayments for car 
financing, and higher car repayments imply a more restricted ability to buy petrol. Thus, people may 
differ in their assessment of petrol (borrowing) costs at different levels of borrowing (petrol) 
expenses.  
Let us now consider the properties required of our chosen instrumental variables. First, the 
instruments must be exogenous to obesity. This appears plausible; it is unlikely that obesity causes 
M2/GDP23 and/or Petrol. Second, instruments should be excludable from the main obesity equation; 
                                                 
21 The data source for M2/GDP is World Development Indicators (online) for non-EU countries and International 
Financial Statistics (online) for the EU countries.  The data for petrol prices are obtained from International Energy 
Agency (2003). Premium Unleaded (95 RON) prices have been used (except Denmark, Japan and South Korea, for 
which only regular unleaded (91-92 RON) prices were available). Premium and regular unleaded prices are highly 
correlated. 
22 For instance, summary statistics in Table 1 show that while a typical US citizen is able to purchase around 88,000 liters 
of petrol (i.e., about 24,000 gallons) with average annual income (the maximum amount in the data set), a typical Turkish 
citizen can buy only about 5,500 liters of petrol.  
23 M2/GDP could be correlated with the obesity error term through correlation with other factors affecting obesity. In a 
reduced form regression of M2/GDP, none of the coefficients for factors suggested by Cutler et al (2003), such as length 
of time to open a business, Big Mac Price Index, frequency of price control implementation, producer protection, and 
number of food statutes were statistically significant (results available from authors). 
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it seems reasonable to assume that M2/GDP, Petrol and their interaction would affect obesity only 
via the motor vehicles linkage.24 The IV assumptions relating to exogeneity and excludability may be 
checked via Hansen over-identification [J-] tests. In all specifications, the Hansen J- test suggests 
that our instrumentation strategy is legitimate in both 2SLS and LIML.25, 26 Third, the coefficients of 
the IVs should be  significant in the regressions of Motor Vehicles on the IVs and all other 
exogenous variables. This requirement relates to the recent literature on strong instruments to which 
we now turn. 
In order to judge the instrument strength based on the Stock and Yogo (2005) rule, we need 
to consider the interaction terms between the legal system variable, Civil and the three IVs, which are 
also considered as instruments in the first stage. Thus we have two endogenous variables (Motor 
Vehicles and Motor Vehicles*Civil) and six instruments. Stock and Yogo suggest two criteria for 
diagnosing weak instruments. The first is that the size distortion on the estimator be less than 10%. 
The critical F-value to attain this standard in our case is 12.33. A second standard is that the IV 
estimator has a maximal bias of 0.10 relative to the OLS estimator; the critical F-value for this 
standard is 9.48. As our F-value is 8.72, our instruments are not strong; hence we adopt a Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood estimator, which is robust to weak instruments and unbalanced 
panels.27 The instruments, although not quite strong, appear to satisfy all other statistical 
requirements. 
                                                 
24 If, conditional on car ownership, car use would decline due to higher petrol prices, then Petrol is not excludable from 
the main regression. A counter-argument is that petrol prices tend to vary uniformly across countries with the world 
price. Our concern is lessened by the finding that when Petrol is included in the Obesity regression its coefficient is 
statistically insignificant (results available from authors). 
25 There might be a correlation between legal systems and M2/GDP and Petrol. During our instrumentation procedure, 
both the aggregate civil law variable and the disaggregated French, German, Scandinavian and Oldsoc variables are 
included in the first stage regressions. This leaves us with non-legal system effects of M2/GDP and Petrol to be 
associated with motor vehicles usage for the second stage estimations. This is what is needed as an exogenous source of 
variation for the instrumentation. 
26 We also considered public transportation availability as an instrument. However, it is difficult to measure this 
availability at the country level. One can get information on a few major cities through, perhaps, metro lines or stations 
per person. But wide availability of public transport in New York does not necessarily imply that the US overall, or even 
the state of New York has good public transportation. In addition, this measure would hardly change over time, limiting 
its inclusion in the panel exploration. 
27 The only disadvantage mentioned by Greene (2002) is that it is not robust to non-normality of the error term. 
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 Before proceeding to the IV and LIML findings, we discuss the first-stage and reduced form 
relationships between our instruments, M2/GDP, Petrol, and M2/GDP*Petrol and motor vehicle 
ownership and obesity. Table 3 displays the relationships using FE treatment of panel effects. 
Models 1 and 2 demonstrate that excluding legal heritage may lead one to incorrectly conclude that 
the instruments, Petrol and M2/GDP, are uncorrelated with motor vehicles per capita. Once legal 
heritage is introduced in Models 3 and 4, the coefficients no longer directly reflect the marginal  
   [Please insert Table 3 about here.]  
effects of M2/GDP and Petrol on Motor Vehicles and the derivatives must be evaluated at a 
particular point.  From Model 3 results for the first stage regression, we find the common law 
marginal effect of Petrol evaluated at the mean of M2/GDP is -8.4; similarly the marginal effect of 
M2/GDP is -0.359.  In the reduced form, column 4, the equivalent marginal effects are 0.716 and 
0.036. The equivalent effects for civil law countries are -5.38 and 0.541 from column 3 and -0.381 
and 0.009 for the reduced form.  
 The results are disappointing in that the first stage marginal effects appear to be rather 
counter-intuitive. A priori we would expect a ceteris paribus increase in petrol affordability to 
increase the number of motor vehicles per capita which would in turn increase the level of obesity in 
the reduced form. However, in common law countries petrol affordability decreases the number of 
motor vehicles and yet increases obesity. Similarly, as M2/GDP rises, we would anticipate greater 
access to funds, consequently an increase in the first stage motor vehicles, which in turn would lead 
to a rise in obesity. Unfortunately, once again for common law countries, there is a conflict between 
the marginal effects in the first stage and the reduced form. Thus the results do not match the 
intuition. The reduced form results for common law countries make perfect sense but conflict with 
the first stage. For civil law countries the reduced form marginal effects for petrol and M2/GDP are 
both close to zero as expected- but once again there are conflicts with the first stage. Thus despite 
some statistical support for our instruments and nice intuition underlying the reduced form results, 
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their weakness in the sense of failure to satisfy the Stock and Yogo (2005) rule combined with first 
stage regression results which are at odds with intuition suggests caution. 
 In Table 4, we report a variety of specifications estimated via 2SLS and LIML with FE and 
RE treatments. From the outset, note that the essential findings are qualitatively similar across most 
specifications, estimation techniques, and panel data treatments; once the interaction term between 
Motor Vehicles and Civil Law is introduced, the results (in columns 7 to 9) are highly  
[Please insert Table 4 about here.] 
robust to the choice of LIML versus 2SLS, and FE versus RE. In Table 4, Motor Vehicles is  
positively related to the obesity percentage but not for civil law countries. First consider the Models 
1 to 6. Models 1 - 3 all find a positive unconditional relationship between Motor Vehicles and 
Obesity, with significance depending on the panel treatment. Models 4 through 6 add a quadratic in 
Log GDP per capita as well as controls for food prices, population density, and lagged public health 
spending. Models 7, 8 and 9 estimate the effects of Motor Vehicles, Civil and their interaction on 
Obesity, in the presence of the controls listed above for models 4-6. Estimated coefficients on the 
main variables of interest are strongly significant. The food price, population density and public 
health expenditure control variables are insignificant in all specifications; hence these factors are of 
second-order importance in explaining cross-country obesity differences over time. Motor Vehicles 
and the Civil intercept term have positive signs, while their interactions have negative signs. 
Depending on the panel treatment and the estimation method, a 100 unit increase in motor vehicles 
per 1,000 residents is associated with a 5.1 to 5.5 percentage point increase in obesity in common 
law countries, while this effect is numerically and statistically zero in civil law countries. The models 
also confirm the U-shaped relationship between obesity and GDP per capita. Ignoring the caveat 
concerning the first stage IV results, model 8 is the preferred specification within Table 4 as LIML is 
preferred given an unbalanced panel and instruments that are not quite strong.  
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5. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we consider the robustness of our OLS panel results, Table 2, to a series of 
robustness checks reported in Table 5. Although the IV estimation is statistically valid, our earlier 
caution about the lack of empirical support in the first stage regressions for the intuition of the 
instruments, leads us to focus our robustness analysis on the panel OLS estimations. Findings with 
the IV estimation of the relevant models are consistent with the reported results but are not discussed 
or reported.  
[Please insert Table 5 about here.] 
It may be that the lower population density of common law vis-a-vis civil law countries is 
driving these results. Model 1 adds the logarithm of the population density to the Model 7 
specification, from Table 2. With some additional data points gained, the results remain qualitatively 
similar. Model 2 interacts log population density with Motor Vehicles and our results related to the 
effects of legal heritage also survive this check. Treating this interaction term as endogenous does 
not make a difference to the results (unreported) .The results on legal heritage are not driven by 
differences in population density. 
Next we consider the disaggregated legal system types. While there is no explicit theoretical 
justification for a finer classification of legal heritage within the civil law tradition in terms of motor 
vehicles-obesity relationship, the previous literature shows that the propensity towards control-
seeking regulations tends to be greater in French than German and Scandinavian law systems (e.g., 
La Porta et al. 1999). Our objective here is simply to investigate whether these tendencies are also 
present in the case of the motor vehicle-obesity relationship. The coefficients in Models 3 imply that 
an increase of 100 motor vehicles per 1,000 residents is, on average, associated with a 4 percentage 
point increase in obesity in common law countries. However, the marginal effects (i.e. incorporating 
the interaction term) are noticeably lower for French, German, Scandinavian and old socialist legal 
heritage. In fact, the p-values of the Wald test in Model 3 for the hypothesis that the coefficient of 
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Motor Vehicles and the relevant legal regime/motor vehicle interaction term suggest that in French 
and Scandinavian legal heritage countries the effect is effectively zero. Using IV estimation as a 
statistical device to address endogeneity of Motor Vehicles, all disaggregated legal system types 
including German legal heritage are found to have a zero effect (unreported).28 Model 4 reports that 
interacting Motor Vehicles with log population density in this setting does not make a difference to 
the general nature of the results with disaggregated legal heritage. These findings suggest that the 
finer classifications of legal systems within the civil law family do not seem to differ from each other 
in the motor vehicle-obesity relationship.  
 To investigate further whether legal origin, rather than other characteristics of a group of 
countries, is driving the results, we test a competing classification. The obvious alternative is 
geography: What if we classified the countries first between Europe and non-Europe instead of 
common and civil law, instead of by legal heritage? Models 5 and 6 show that these alternative 
classifications are insignificant in explaining the motor vehicles-obesity relationship and thus are not 
driving our main findings. 29 Models 7 and 8 run a ‘horse race’ between MVPC*Civil and 
MVPC*Europe by including them in the same regression. Interestingly both are found to be 
significant, with MVPC*Europe having a positive coefficient and MVPC*Civil still having negative 
coefficient. We conclude that the civil law/common law distinction is important for both Europe and 
the rest of the world, and once one controls for legal heritage and other factors there remains a small 
but statistically significant positive effect on obesity in Europe vis-a-vis non-European OECD 
countries on the order of 1.6 per cent. 
                                                 
28 All the Hansen tests justify our IV strategy in this case as well. First-stage and reduced form results in the case of 
disaggregate legal systems offer similar conclusions as in the case of binary categorization above (results available upon 
request). It must be mentioned, however, that the critical value tables provided in Stock and Yogo become inapplicable 
when the disaggregated legal system variables are used. It is also unclear how the unbalanced panel nature of the dataset 
and the error covariance structure affect all the inference related to F-statistics. See, for instance, Bun and de Haan 
(2010). The 2SLS and the LIML results, nevertheless, offer qualitatively and quantitatively close implications in our 
context. 
29 We would like to thank a referee for this point. We make a similar classification by Western Europe and North 
America, Eastern Europe, and the rest of the OECD countries, but our results remain similar. 
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Is there any potential non-linearity regarding the impact of motor vehicles on obesity? 
Expanding the model with motor vehicles squared and its interaction with Civil does not deliver 
significant results.30 Hence, we prefer the linear models. 
  All in all, our results are remarkably consistent across estimation method and specification.  
The impact of an increase in motor vehicle ownership consistently leads to a rise in obesity of around 
4-5% in common law countries, but virtually no impact in common law countries. At this stage, a 
hypothetical question might help put things into perspective. What if a typical common law country 
would regulate motor vehicle use just as a civil law country does?  Using the standard calculation for 
the marginal effect of a discrete variable we find that a common law country with current median 
motor vehicle ownership at 551 would see a ceteris paribus reduction of 7.86 percent in its obesity 
level.  
 
6. CONCLUSION  
In examining the role of legal heritage in the pattern of international obesity, we find highly 
robust results. Obesity growth rates appear to be higher in common law countries of the OECD 
where there is a strong positive correlation between obesity and motor vehicles per capita. 
Econometric analysis of cross-country and panel data for the period 1990-2005 suggests that motor 
vehicle ownership is strongly and directly associated with the prevalence of obesity across country 
and over time for common law countries; little or no such evidence emerges for countries following a 
civil law tradition. These results hold with fixed effects, random effects, instrumental variables, and 
limited information maximum likelihood estimation.  
Despite some inherent limitations of the data, our findings indicate the significant role that 
legal heritage plays in translating motor vehicle ownership into a contributory factor to obesity. 
Increased motor vehicle ownership is implicated in rising obesity in common law countries such as 
                                                 
30 These two nonlinearity results are available upon request. 
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the US. Common law countries, as opposed to countries following civil law, appear to be at 
particular risk; reduced physical activity is implicated in the obesity rise where government does not 
substantially restrict the use of motor vehicles or control urban sprawl. This finding provides a 
counterweight to the growing economics literature echoing Hayek (1973) which points to the 
superiority of common law for economic welfare, see La Porta et al (1999) and Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005). 
 Our work also sheds light on governmental behavior that is induced by daily choices of 
individuals. Becker and Murphy’s [1988] rational addiction model suggests individuals with high 
discount rates may make individual choices that lead (rationally) to addiction. But substantial health 
care financing externalities mean that individual and social welfare may not line up. Hence there is a 
role for government to potentially improve social welfare by altering individual decision-making 
calculations.  Governments following a common law heritage may face difficulties related to passing 
and enforcing laws that circumscribe individual choice on transport mode, and residential location.  
Countries with civil law heritage can do so more easily with a concomitant reduction in the growth 
of obesity.  
 Countries with a common law heritage tend to place a high weight on individual choice. The 
challenge for such countries is to find mechanisms for increasing overall physical activity so that 
individual choice may be respected without adverse health consequences and without increasing 
overall costs to society. Interestingly in a different public health challenge, cigarette smoking, the 
U.S., despite its common law heritage, has been able to achieve severe restrictions on individuals’ 
right to smoke. Although there are differences, examining that public health campaign might provide 
valuable lessons for common law heritage countries aiming to withstand the rise in obesity. 
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Figure 1. Obesity vs. Motor Vehicle Reliance
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (Panel Data) 
Variable  Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
Civil Law  0.80 1 1 0 0.40 
    French Legal System  0.37 0 1 0 0.48 
    German Legal System  0.15 0 1 0 0.36 
    Scandinavian Legal System  0.20 0 1 0 0.40 
    Old Socialist Country  0.08 0 1 0 0.26 
Common Law  0.20 0 1 0 0.40 
Percentage of Population Obese (%) Overall 11.39 10.1 32.2 2.2 5.98 
 Civil 9.47 9.10 21.9 2.2 4.32 
 Common 18.89 18.50 32.2 10 5.66 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Motor Vehicles (per 1000 people) Overall 510 503 769 88 114.65 
 Civil 500 500 751 88 109 
 Common 551 538 769 387 114 
  (0.03) (0.07)    
M2/GDP (%) Overall 99.54 72.39 393.94 28.53 72.34 
 Civil 102.41 68.05 393.94 28.53 80.00 
 Common 88.45 79.64 150.08 52.78 24.99 
  (0.35) (0.05)    
Petrol Purchasing Power (scaled by 10,000) Overall 3.0148 2.7532 8.8367 0.5493 1.3113 
 Civil 2.8396 2.7532 6.5253 0.5493 1.0651 
 Common 3.6952 2.8508 8.8367 2.1018 1.8766 
  (0.00) (0.86)    
PPP-adjusted GDP Per Capita (US$) Overall 24,414 23,841 57,392 6,682 8314 
 Civil 24,301 23,904 57,392 6,682 8,796 
 Common 24,855 23,403 39,590 16,546 6,185 
  (0.75) (0.87)    
In parentheses are the probabilty values for the test of equality of means/medians for civil and common law countries. 
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 Table 2. Legal Systems, Motor Vehicles Reliance and Obesity –  
OLS Regressions  
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cross-sectional dataset is the 1998-2003 average of 
observations. In panel analysis, all standard errors are clustered at the country level. FE: Fixed Effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Cross-Sectional Dataset Panel Dataset 
 Dependent Variable: Percentage of Population Obese 
Motor Vehicles 0.0101  0.0440** 0.0420** -0.00226 0.0444*** 0.0378*** 
 (1.40)  (2.72) (2.48) (-0.259) (4.842) (4.978) 
Civil Law  -8.723*** 18.54* 14.84    
  (-3.88) (1.81) (1.29)    
Motor Vehicles*Civil Law   -0.0465** -0.0402**  -0.0487*** -0.0446*** 
   (-2.69) (-2.05)  (-8.370) (-11.54) 
Log Per Capita Income    -69.43   -94.28*** 
    (-0.88)   (-2.988) 
Log Per Capita Income Sq.    3.475   4.838*** 
    (0.87)   (3.129) 
Constant   -6.047 341.7 22.11*** -7.211 456.2*** 
   (-0.62) (0.87) (4.171) (-1.287) (2.832) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 147 147 147 
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.36 0.45 0.42    
Time Effects 0.03 0.33   YES YES YES 
Panel Effects     FE FE FE 
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Table 3. First Stage and Reduced Form Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 First-Stage  Reduced Form 
 Dep. Var.: Motor Vehicle Per Capita DV: Obesity 
     
Petrol -5.212 -5.416 19.38** 4.227*** 
 (-0.364) (-0.354) (2.191) (8.670) 
Petrol*Civil Law   -44.83*** -4.321*** 
   (-3.547) (-6.557) 
M2/GDP -0.00150 -0.116 0.801** 0.183*** 
 (-0.00683) (-0.451) (2.100) (12.33) 
M2/GDP*Civil Law   -0.791** -0.184*** 
   (-2.249) (-10.03) 
M2/GDP*Petrol 0.0199 0.0364 -0.314*** -0.0397*** 
 (0.166) (0.298) (-2.858) (-9.047) 
M2/GDP*Petrol*Civil Law   0.510*** 0.0369*** 
   (4.777) (6.740) 
Log Per Capita Inc.  -1540** -1383** -86.77*** 
  (-2.240) (-2.354) (-3.796) 
Log Per Capita Inc. Sq.  79.03** 73.41** 4.360*** 
  (2.225) (2.417) (3.578) 
Food Price Index 0.776* 0.958*** 0.835*** -0.0113* 
 (1.794) (5.279) (5.697) (-2.037) 
Log Population Den. -54.16 -325.5 -131.4 14.64 
 (-0.140) (-0.863) (-0.438) (1.421) 
Lag Pub. Health Exp. 0.846 1.021 0.952 0.0971 
 (0.506) (0.746) (0.806) (1.461) 
Constant 633.3** 8332** 7070** 419.3*** 
 (2.097) (2.343) (2.322) (3.771) 
     
Observations 121 121 121 121 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES 
Panel Effects FE FE FE FE 
F-stat. on excluded instruments 0.06 0.07 8.72***  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the country level. FE: Fixed Effects. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Civil vs Common Law, Motor Vehicle Reliance, and Obesity –  
IV Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Dependent Variable: Percentage of Population Obese 
          
Motor Vehicles PC 0.0929 0.683 0.0258*** -0.228 -0.590 0.0379** 0.0517*** 0.0553*** 0.0508*** 
 (0.704) (0.122) (2.734) (-0.443) (-0.191) (2.217) (5.181) (3.441) (5.118) 
MVPC*Civil Law       -0.0547*** -0.0564*** -0.0552*** 
       (-14.52) (-16.09) (-8.690) 
Civil Law         22.56*** 
         (4.968) 
Log Per Capita Inc.    -473.2 -1027 -107.9*** -108.2*** -104.6*** -103.3*** 
    (-0.581) (-0.215) (-2.973) (-4.625) (-3.864) (-5.884) 
Log Per Capita Inc. Sq.    24.37 52.61 4.995*** 5.578*** 5.391*** 5.288*** 
    (0.587) (0.216) (2.611) (4.597) (3.821) (5.726) 
Food Price Index    0.215 0.562 -0.00715 -0.00571 -0.00768 -0.00581 
    (0.433) (0.189) (-0.879) (-0.561) (-0.504) (-0.893) 
Log Population Den.    -74.60 -190.2 -0.874 -5.708 -5.205 0.203 
    (-0.356) (-0.174) (-1.439) (-0.583) (-0.473) (0.242) 
Lag Pub. Health Exp.    0.297 0.651 -0.0841 0.0478 0.0450 0.0438 
    (0.496) (0.202) (-1.581) (0.833) (0.718) (1.081) 
          
Observations 126 126 126 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Estimation Method 2SLS LIML 2SLS 2SLS LIML 2SLS 2SLS LIML 2SLS 
Instruments Petrol, M2/GDP and 
Petrol*M2/GDP  
Petrol, M2/GDP and 
Petrol*M2/GDP and their 
interactions with Civil Law 
Petrol, M2/GDP and Petrol*M2/GDP and 
their interactions with Civil Law 
Hansen’s J  (p-value) 0.31 0.90  0.77 0.94  0.11 0.11  
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel Effects FE FE RE FE FE RE FE FE RE 
Hausman Test (p-value)   0.50   0.98   1.00 
Constant term included in all specifications. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the 
country level (except when RE is used) . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Hansen’s J test for overidentifying restrictions, 
with the null hypothesis that excluded restrictions are valid. Hausman test - FE vs RE: The associated p-value for 
systematic difference between Fixed Effects and Random Effects coefficients, with “no difference” being the null. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent Variable: Percentage of Population Obese 
         
Motor Vehicles PC 0.0332*** 0.0655*** 0.0403*** 0.0815*** -0.0150* -0.0101 0.0226*** 0.0572*** 
 (6.123) (3.518) (4.764) (3.697) (-1.714) (-0.336) (3.769) (3.443) 
MVPC*Civil Law -0.0435*** -0.0462***     -0.0449*** -0.0479*** 
 (-17.22) (-11.76)     (-17.72) (-16.08) 
MVPC*French Law   -0.0441*** -0.0415***     
   (-11.58) (-9.438)     
MVPC*German Law   -0.0680*** -0.0604***     
   (-8.495) (-6.380)     
MVPC*Scandinav. Law   -0.0385*** -0.0589***     
   (-6.417) (-4.685)     
MVPC*Old Soc. Law   -0.0487*** -0.0471***     
   (-3.701) (-3.679)     
MVPC*Europe     0.00983 0.00994 0.0152*** 0.0163*** 
     (0.987) (1.031) (2.706) (3.016) 
Log Per Capita Inc. -96.46*** -101.9*** -90.94*** -118.3*** -108.0** -109.0** -93.86*** -99.58*** 
 (-2.762) (-3.071) (-2.619) (-3.565) (-2.425) (-2.542) (-2.805) (-3.190) 
Log Per Capita Inc. Sq. 4.990*** 5.173*** 4.454** 5.909*** 5.688** 5.726** 4.719*** 4.901*** 
 (2.836) (3.078) (2.491) (3.427) (2.419) (2.504) (2.801) (3.115) 
Log Population Density 6.987 6.966 5.341 -1.980 12.25 12.30 9.094 9.224 
 (0.864) (0.883) (0.599) (-0.233) (0.787) (0.775) (1.218) (1.312) 
MVPC*Log Pop Den.  -0.00574**  -0.00887*  -0.000957  -0.00628** 
  (-2.143)  (-1.942)  (-0.190)  (-2.492) 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel Effects FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
F-test (p-value)  0.10  0.14  0.71  0.04 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OLS Estimations. All standard errors are clustered at the country level. Food price index and lag public 
health expenditure are included in the regressions. F-test is for the joint significance of the regressors in bold in the respective equation. 
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Figure 4. M2/GDP and Motor Vehicle Reliance
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
M
ot
or
 V
eh
ic
le
s 
P
er
 1
00
0 
P
eo
pl
e
0 2 4 6 8
Petrol
All countries
Panel Data Set (1990-2004)
Figure 5. Petrol and Motor Vehicle Reliance
